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Abstract
The contribution of this paper is twofold. Firstly, we explore the e¤ects
of trade liberalization and commuting costs on the location of entrepre-
neurs. The model reveals a dispersion-agglomeration-dispersion cong-
uration when trade gets freer. Furthermore we prove that when both
commuting costs and trade integration are high, then dispersion Pareto
dominates agglomeration. Secondly, we use this framework to investigate
the e¤ect of trade on corruption at di¤erent levels of democracy and in-
stability. We show that corruption is bell-shaped with respect to trade
liberalization in stable and democratic regimes but also in unstable dic-
tatorships.
JEL classication: D73; H25; R12; F12
Keywords: Economic geography; Cities; Trade; Corruption.
1 Introduction
Good governance can be dened as a process free of abuse, of corruption and
that avoids waste with due regard for the rule of law by which a government
makes decisions and implements them. This topic is currently one of the pri-
orities of international organisations to ensure sustainable human development
and economic growth. For instance, the World Bank wants to promote a «
systematic framework for addressing corruption as a development issue in the
assistance it provides to countries and in its operation work more generally » 1 .
Moreover, multilateral measures such as the Convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Public O¢ cials in International Business Transactions, signed in No-
vember 1997 by the OECD or more recently the United Nations Convention
against Corruption adopted in December 20032 , indicate the increasing impor-
tance of this issue. Beginning with Le¤ (1964) and Huntington (1968), the
debate relative to the e¤ects of bad governance was quite optimistic. For them
corruption has a positive impact on growth, because on the one hand it allows
The author is grateful to Marc FLEURBAEY for his help and constructive comments.
1Marquette (2003)
2The Heads of State and Government of the African Union have also signed on july 2003
the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption.
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one to speed money by avoiding bureaucracy delay, and on the other hand
it favors the increase in employeese¢ ciency when bribes act as a piece rate.
These conclusions however are not shared by North (1990) or Shleifer and Vishny
(1993) who consider that good governance is essential as regards economic per-
formance. These analyses were veried for the rst time by Mauro (1995), who
shows that corruption lowers private investment, by Tanzi and Davoodi (1997),
who demonstrate that this variable impacts negatively on the quality of public
investment, by Mauro (1998), who reveals that bad governance creates a bias
against public spending on education and, lastly, by Gupta et al..(2000), who
nds a similar result concerning health care.
Bad governance and corruption thus appear to be harmful and deserve at-
tention, all the more as they are widespread and signicant phenomena. For
instance, a recent study of the U.S. General Accounting O¢ ce (2004) reports
that in Nigeria corruption is known as the 10 percent syndrome since a 10
percent uno¢ cial tax is paid to the institution in order to ensure that it
performs its o¢ cial functions. But bad governance is not only found in devel-
oping countries3 , rich and newly industrialized countries are also a¤ected by
such a phenomenon. Thus, because good governance is a master challenge for
many countries, we want to understand how anti-corruption e¤orts can operate
through trade liberalization. Empirical works have already tackled this ques-
tion. Azfar and Lee (2002) by analysing a large cross section study of countries,
have found a negative link between corruption and tari¤ rates, and likewise,
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) show that the level of opening is correlated to
institutions that monopolize local markets. Rodrik (2002) also sees trade liber-
alization as a way to improve institutions. However, by considering case studies
and stylised facts these conclusions are perhaps not so robust. In Figure 1 we
plot the reverse of the Corruption Perception Index4 for developing countries
i.e for China, Cameroon and Russia and in Figure 2 for developed countries i.e
for the EUs Core (average of Belgium, France, Germany and Italy), for USA
and for Japan over the period 1980-2004.
3Sachs et al. (2004) for instance by controlling for the per capita income, nd that Sub-
Saharan Africa countries have a relatively good indicator of governance. See however Kau¤-
mann et al. (2005) for a critic of this argument
4The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is based on corruption-related data in expert
surveys. It reects the point of view (perception) of business people and experts concerning
corruption. An increase in this index reects a decrease in the perception of corruption, thats
why we take the reverse i.e. 1/CPI, thus an increase in this inversed CPI represents an increase
in the perception of corruption.
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Figure 1 Corruption perception Index for developing countries (1980-2004)
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Figure 2 Corruption perception Index for developed countries (1980-2004)
All these countries have known signicant trade and nancial liberalizations over
this period, and for all of them bad governance trend seems to follow a bellshape.
This observation leads us to wonder what the e¤ect of trade is on government
behavior at di¤erent levels of democracy and instability. The answer is going
to be found on the theoretical ground of the New Economic Geography by inte-
grating bad governance, instability and democracy in a model of location. The
analysis is divided into three parts: in the rst one we develop a new version of
3
the Krugman and Livas (1996) model by integrating an immobile factor in it5 ,
and by using a specic cost function which makes this model analytically more
solvable than the original. The second step displays the location results of this
model, at rst a gradual agglomeration and then a total one can appear when
trade gets freer, but next only dispersion is sustainable. Furthermore, when
commuting costs are high, this dispersion Pareto dominates agglomeration be-
cause everyone is better o¤. Lastly, the third part shows under which condition
the corruption is bell-shaped with respect to trade liberalization.
2 The model
2.1 Pattern of space
There are three regions in this model, two monocentric cities and the rest of
the world. While in the cities a Constant Returns to Scale activity (CRS) can
cohabit with an Increasing Returns to Scale activity (IRS), only the former
exists in the rest of the world6 . In this economy, there are two kinds of workers,
entrepreneurs who work in the IRS sector and who commute from one city to
the next and unskilled workers who are immobile and work in CRS activities.
Unlike unskilled workers who do not need to commute and who are located in
city suburbs, where land rent is null, entrepreneurs who own one unit of land
are spread along a line, and because their business is located in the middle of
this line (called the Central Business District (CBD)) they need to commute.
These commuting costs have a direct impact on their labour force. As each of
them owns one labour unit, the total amount supplied by an entrepreneur who
lives on the fringe of the CBD (i.e. at location x, the CBD being at location 0
by convention) is:
s(x) = (1  2 j x j (1)
where  (with  < 1) is entrepreneurs commuting cost level, j x j measures
distance to CBD. Furthermore, as the number of entrepreneurs is h, entrepre-
neursmaximal distance from the CBD is h2 , thus the total labour supply net
of entrepreneurscommuting cost in one city is equal to:
S =
h=2Z
 h=2
s(x)dx = h(1  h=2) (2)
5Crozet and Koening-Soubeyran (2003), or Brulhart et al. (2003) also integrate an immo-
bile factor, but they drop the explicit treatment of the land rent which is the very new feature
of the seminal model.
6Contrary to Crozet and Koenig-Soubeyran (2004), Brulhart et al. (2004) or Paluzie(1998),
we do not integrate the IRS in the rest of the world because we want to focus on the e¤ect
of the external demand, and thus to cut external competition. This is in line with Krugman
and Livas (1996) who consider that IRS exist in the rest of the world but make this sector
not inuencial for cities by taking the wage in this external market as the numéraire and by
equalizing it to price.
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As land rent at both edges of the segment is normalized to zero, if wh is entre-
preneurswage near the CBD, then their wage net of commuting costs earned
at both edges is:
s(h=2)wh = s( h=2)wh = (1  h)wh (3)
Because consumers are identical in terms of preferences and income, at equi-
librium they must reach the same utility level. Thus entrepreneurs who live
on the fringe of the segment only receive a net wage of (1   h)wh but pay no
land rent. On the contrary, workers who live near the CBD do not pay signif-
icant commuting costs, but the price of the services yielded by land is higher
in this location. Thus, the increase in real wage near central places o¤sets land
rent. A move from the suburb to the CBD implies a decrease in commuting
and therefore an increase in net wage, but also an equivalent increase in land
rent which equalizes utility among individuals. In other terms, the following
condition must be veried:
s(x)wh  R(x) = (1  h)wh
where s(x) is the total amount supplied by a worker who lives on the fringe of
the CBD, R(x) is the land rent prevailing at x, while the RHS (right-hand side)
represents the wage net of commuting costs earned at both edges given by (3).
By inserting expression (1) into this system we nd the following land rent:
R(x) = (h  2 j x j)wh with x 2 ( h=2; h=2)
Thanks to that, we can nd the Aggregate Land Rent (ALR):
ARLh =
h=2Z
 h=2
R(x)dx = h2wh
While on the one hand, Tabuchi (1998) assumes that there are absentee land-
lords, and on the other, Helpman (1998) assumes that the aggregate land rent
is owned at global level, here it is assumed with Krugman and Livas (1996) that
each entrepreneur owns an equal share of the ALR where they reside. Thus
their non salaried income is:
ALR
h
=
hwh
2
(4)
We can now turn to consumersbehavior.
2.1.1 Consumersbehavior
All consumers share the same Cobb-Douglas utility function and consume one
industrial good, which is a composite of di¤erent varieties, and one agricultural
good:
U =MA1  with M =
24 NZ
0
m
 1

i di
35

 1
(5)
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where M is the consumption of a manufactures aggregate, A of the agricul-
tural good, N is the large number of potential varieties m and  > 1 is the
elasticity of substitution among these varieties. A share  of nominal income,
denoted Y , is spent on manufactures, and 1    on agricultural produce. The
budget constraint is then given by:
PM + pAA = Y
where pA is the price of the agricultural good and P the price index of those
varieties:
P =
24 NZ
0
p1 i di
35
1
1 
(6)
which is a decreasing function of the number of varieties produced N (because
1   < 0). pi is the price of a typical variety i. The impact of N on the price
index is inuenced by the elasticity of substitution. The more di¤erentiated the
product varieties, the greater the reduction in the price index. The maximiza-
tion problem yields the following uncompensated demand for agriculture and
manufactures:
M = 
Y
P
; A = (1  ) Y
pa
(7)
mi = 
Y
P 1 
p i (8)
with Y = h(1  
2
h)wh (9)
where (1  2h)wh comes from the income of land ownership (hwh=2) and from
the wage net of commuting costs ((1  h)wh=2). From this and the price index
expression we can see that an increase in the number of industrial products
depresses demand for each variety.
We can now turn to rmsbehavior.
2.2 Firmsbehavior
Concerning the cost function, we assume that the production of a typical variety
of manufactured goods involves entrepreneursservices as a xed cost, and the
use of  units of unskilled workers for each unit of output produced7 . Thus the
total cost of producing q units of a typical manufactured variety is:
TC = wh + wuq (10)
where wu is unskilled workerswages.
7This cost function has been used for the rst time by Forslid and Ottaviano (2002) in
Krugmans Core-Periphery model and has never been applied to the urban economic theory
because the immobile factor was absent (see Krugman and Livas (1996), Candau (2005),
Murata and Thisse (2005)).
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Because each rm produces a distinct variety, the number of rms is also the
number of varieties consumed. Thus each rm is a monopolist on the production
of its variety, and faces the demand function (8). But a key feature of the Dixit-
Stiglitz monopolistic competition is that rms ignore the e¤ects of their action
on income Y , and on the price index P . Hence the demand curve as perceived
by a typical rm is not (8), but rather:
q = bp 
where b = Y=P 1  is considered as a constant by each rm. According to this
behavior, when maximizing its prot, a typical rm sets the following price:
p = wu=(   1) (11)
An important and new feature is that prices are now constant and independent
of entrepreneurs wages. Because there is free entry, prots are always equal to
zero, which, using (10) and (11), gives the level of output:
q = (   1)wh=wu (12)
In equilibrium, a typical rm employs one units of capital, so that the total
demand is n. As entrepreneurs labour supply is exactly S, the equalization
gives the number of varieties produced:
n = S (13)
The number of varieties produced is then proportional to the number of workers.
2.3 Trade and commuting e¤ects
So far, the model has almost been described as a closed economy. The next step
is to relax this assumption. Industrial varieties are exchanged between regions
under transaction costs which take the form of iceberg costs: if an industrial
variety produced in the Northern market is sold at price p there, then the
delivered price (c.i.f) of that variety in the South and in the rest of the world8
is going to be p.
The assumption of iceberg costs implies that rms charge the same producer
price in both regions. The rst-order conditions for a typical rms sales to its
local market and to its export markets are:
p = wu=(   1) (14)
p = p = wu=(   1) (15)
8Unlike the literature we do not distinguish between regional and international trade. This
distinction is indeed interesting as long as there is no preferential aggreement between one of
the city and the rest of the world (see Brülhart et al. (2004) and Crozet and Koenig-Soubeyran
(2004) for such an analysis) because the e¤ect of regional and international liberalization has
the same e¤ect on entrepreneurslocation.
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With Krugman and Livas Elizondo we assume that the input-output coe¢ cient
is equal to the reverse of the mark-up. This normalization and the fact that
wages in the agricultural sector are taken as the numeraire and normalized to
one, simplify prices which are equal to one (in (11)). Furthermore the total
number of entrepreneurs is also normalized to one: h+ h = 1.
Iceberg transaction costs also imply a modication of the price index. Using
the above normalization we nd:
  P 1  = S + S (16)
  (P )1  = S + S (17)
  (P )1  = S + S (18)
where  measures the freeness of trade :  = ()1 . This degree of trade
increases from  = 0 with innite trade costs, to  = 1, with zero trade costs.
At the symmetric equilibrium (h = 1=2), an increase in S (and so a decrease
in S) implies, as long as transaction costs exist ( < 1), an increase in the
price index in the South and a decrease in the price index in the North. Here
however, this e¤ect does not depend only on transaction costs but also on urban
costs, thus through (2) we nd:


=
h(1  h=2) + (1  h)(1  (1  h)=2)
h(1  h=2) + (1  h)(1  (1  h)=2)
This expression will allow us to prove the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Starting from the symmetric equilibrium (h = 1=2) a small move-
ment of entrepreneurs from the South to the North, always decreases the relative
price index in northern cities as long as trade is not utterly free ( < 1). Fur-
thermore, this e¤ect is decreasing when it comes to trade freeness as well as
commuting costs.
Proof. At h = 1=2, a higher h raises  and depresses  through:
@(=)
@h
jh=1=2=  8(   2)(  1)
(   4)(+ 1) > 0 if  < 1
Moreover, as the price index is a decreasing function of  ( P 1  with  > 1)
we have d(P=P
)
dh < 0:
This e¤ect is however limited by a decrease in commuting costs and trade
liberalization:
@(=)=@h
@
j h=1=2 = 16 (  1)
(+ 1) (   4)2 < 0 if  < 1
@(=)=@h
@
j h=1=2 =  16 (   2)
(   4) (+ 1)2 < 0
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We now need to integrate transaction costs into the demand function.
By inserting the above prices (11) into the demand function (8), and by
considering the total demand as the sum of local demand and export demand
we nd:
q = (
Y 

+
Y

+ 
Y 

) (19)
Ceteris paribus, the demand in the North is an increasing function of the income
Y , and a decreasing function of the price index P . Obviously the higher
international trade liberalization, , the higher the impact of the rest of the
world on the northern demand. Considering the second and third term, we
have just seen (Lemma 1) that an increase in the population in the North,
increases  and decreases , and thus fosters a decrease in the total demand
q in the North (if  < 1). But how does a change of location impact on income?
A glance at the following equations will provide an answer:
Y  = Lwu (20)
Y = h(1  h=2)w + Lwu (21)
Y  = h(1  h=2)w + Lwu (22)
An increase in the entrepreneurial force, S, in the North, and thus a decrease in
the South, S, increases home expenditure and lowers it abroad which implies,
as long as impediment to trade exists ( < 1), an increase of the demand q.
2.4 Market clearing condition and long-run equilibrium
These equations now permit us to present the market clearing in a tidy form by
equalizing of the demand (19) to the supply (12), which gives:
w = (
Y
P 1 
+ 
Y 
(P )1 
) (23)
w = (
Y
P 1 
+
Y 
(P )1 
) (24)
By inserting income equations into this system, we obtain nominal wages9 , which
allow us to express the relative wage in the North through:
w
w
=
L( +) + L+ bS(  1)(L(1 + ) + L)
L( +) + L+ bS(  1)(L(1 + ) + L)
with b =


9Wages are given in the North and South respectively by:
w =   b(L
( +) + L+ bS(  1)(L(1 + ) + L))
(  + b(S+ S) + b2SS(2   1)
w =   b(L
( +) + L+ bS(  1)(L(1 + ) + L))
(  + b(S+ S) + b2SS(2   1)
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From the previous subsection we know that two opposite forces drive these
relative nominal wages, indeed on the one hand an increase in the number of
entrepreneurs in one city exacerbates local competition among rms, thus new
entry triggers a slump in the price index, and thereby in operating prots too,
so that in order to stay in the market rms need to remunerate their workers
less (local competition e¤ect), but on the other hand as the income generated by
the new entrepreneur is spent locally, sales and operating prots increase and
under the zero prot condition this implies a higher nominal wage (market
access e¤ect). However entrepreneurs do not consider the relative nominal wage
when they decide to migrate but the relative real wage. Hence in the long run,
migration stops when real wages are equalized in case of symmetry (h = 12 ), or
when agglomeration in one city generates a higher relative real wage. Thus by
denoting 
(h; ; ; L) this relative real wage, and by dening it by:

(h; ; ; L) =
V (h; ; ; L)
V (h; ; ; L)
(25)
=
w
w
1  h=2
1  h=2(


) a (26)
with a =

   1 (27)
where V is total real income of location in the North, including landowner
income. We will have a stable total agglomeration in the North if 
(1; ; ; L) >
1, and a stable dispersed equilibrium if d
(1=2; )=dh < 0.
Let us notice that in the long run (26) two additional forces appear : on
the one hand the term (1   h=2) which enters multiplicatively in the indirect
utility, creates a dispersive force independently of transaction costs, which is the
land market-crowding e¤ect and on the other hand the third term = which
is the cost of living e¤ect, is known to be an agglomerative force. Indeed, from
Lemma 1 we know that goods are cheaper in a central place because imports
are lower and thus the burden of transaction costs too. Hence, entrepreneurs
purchasing power is higher in this location.
3 Locations, critical points and welfare
As the model is symmetric, a dispersion of activities is always an equilibrium.
However, the stability of this equilibrium is not always satised, a stable ag-
glomerative equilibrium can appear, thus in this section we are going to ask
two questions: How sustainable is the agglomeration? When is the symmetric
equilibrium broken?
3.0.1 The Sustain point(s)
The sustain point is the critical point of trade liberalization at which the Core-
Periphery pattern is sustainable. To determine whether agglomeration in the
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North is an equilibrium we need to know whether a small deviation of entre-
preneurs increases their welfare or not. If it does, the Core-Periphery pattern
is not an equilibrium. In other words total agglomeration, h = 1 is an equilib-
rium if 
(1; ; ; L) > 1. Hence, the sustain point is dened implicitly when

(1; ; ; L) = 1, which gives
s :
(2L+ L)(1  )1 a
L(1 + 2   b(1  2)) + L(1  b(1  )) = 1 (28)
Unlike a part of the literature where the implicit sustain point is unique in the
interval [0; 1], here there can be two solutions. Thus by denoting s the lower
roots and s the higher ones, the agglomerative equilibrium is sustainable only
if  2 [s; s]. We make some simulations in order to see how much this interval
varies with commuting costs and the size of the external market.
Figure 3 The Sustain Points
In Figure 3, the horizontal axis measures the level of trade liberalization while
the vertical axis displays the relative indirect utility in the case of agglomeration
i.e. the right term of equation (28). Sustain points are at the intersection
of curves and the unity. The regular line (curve 
(1; ; 0:105; 15)) represents
our benchmark and shows that agglomeration is sustainable when  belongs
approximately to the interval [0:07; 0:45], indeed in such a case welfare in the
North is the highest (
(1; ; ; L) > 1). Starting from this, an increase in
congestion costs and a decrease in the size of the external market generates a
downward translation of the curve and thus reduces the interval of sustainability
(dashed line 
(1; ; 0:16; 5)):
Proposition 2 The relative welfare under agglomeration in the North is bell-
shaped with respect to the free-ness of trade. Thus two sustain points exists until
trade points reach a critical value, which forbids any agglomeration sustainabil-
ity;
us =
aL( 1 + b) +p4( 1 + a)(1 + a)L( 1 + b)(L+ bL+ bL) + (aL(1  b))2
2(1 + a)(L+ bL+ bL)
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Furthermore, an increase in congestion costs () decreases the interval of trade
freeness () for which the agglomeration is a stable equilibrium.
Proof. We write (28) as:

(1; ; ; L)  (2L+ L)(1  )1 a (29)
 L(1 + 2   b(1  2))  L(1  b(1  ))
= 0
Around the extreme value of  we know that 
(1; ; ; L) is negative:

(1; 0; ; L) =  L(1  b) < 0

(1; 1; ; L) =  (2L+ L) < 0
Furthermore this expression is respectively increasing and decreasing in  around
autarky ( = 0) and around free trade ( = 1):
@
(1; ; ; L)
@
= (1 )(1 a) a(2L+L) 2L(1+b) L(1+b( 1)) (30)
thus:
@
(1; 0; ; L)
@
> 0
because lim!0 a = +1
and
@
(1; 1; ; L)
@
=  (2L+ L)(a(1  ) +  + b) < 0
In order to show that 
(1; ; ; L) is a bell shape we now need to demonstrate
that this expression admits only one maximum. This is found if @
2
(1;;;L)
@2
<
0; which is veried10 : @
2
(1;;;L)
@2
=  a(1  a)(1  )(2L+L) a 1  2L(1+
b)   2Lb < 0: We can nd this maximum when the top of the bell shape
is equal to zero. Indeed in such a case we know that @
(1;;;L
)
@ = 0 or

(1; ; ; L) = 0; the rst expression (given by (30) permits to obtain  a =
2L(1+b)+L(1+b( 1+2))
(1 )(1 a)(2L+L) and by inserting this into the second expression (29)
we get the critical value of trade costs:
us =
aL( 1 + b) +p4( 1 + a)(1 + a)L( 1 + b)(L+ bL+ bL) + (aL   abL)2
2(1 + a)(L+ bL+ bL)
Lastly, we must demonstrate how the relative welfare under agglomeration
(
(1; ; ; L)) varies with  : @
(1;;;L
)
@ =  (2L + L)1 a < 0. An in-
crease in congestion costs generates a downward translation of (
(1; ; ; L)).
After the sustain point, we can now turn to the break point.
10 Indeed according to the "no black hole condition" 1  a > 0
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3.0.2 The break point(s)
The break point is the critical point of transaction costs at which a dispersive
equilibrium is broken. Suppose that workers are equally dispersed, then in order
to determine if this situation is an equilibrium we need to know whether or not
a small deviation increases welfare. If it does, dispersion is not an equilibrium.
Thus we want to know the sign of @
(h; )=@h when h = 12 . We nd that the
dispersive equilibrium is broken when  2 [b; b], where b and b are given
by:
b =
2(1 + a)bL(a1=a) + 2La2 + 4La4 s
(4(L((1 + a)b(a1=a) + a2) + 2La4)2 
4(b  1)(L(a1 + a2) + 2L( 8 + a1   a2))a5
2a5
b =
2(1 + a)bL(a1=a) + 2La2 + 4La4+s
(4(L((1 + a)b(a1=a) + a2) + 2La4)2 
4(b  1)(L(a1 + a2) + 2L( 8 + a1   a2))a5
2a5
with
a1 = 2a(   2)2; a2 = (   4); a3 = 1 + b
a4 = 8 + ba1 + 3a2
a5 = 2La3(8 + a1 + a2) + L
(a3a1   a2 + b(16 + 3a2))
Figure 4 depicts how much these break points depend on parameters11 . The
horizontal axis measures the level of commuting costs, while the vertical axis
plots the level of b. Normal lines indicate the lower roots of b for three di¤erent
values of the relative size of the external market, while the dashed lines show
how the upper bound b varies with these parameters.
11 In all the simulations we take the same values for ; ;  and L:  = 5;  = 0:4;  =
1; L = L = 0:3 and L = 15, when there is no opposite precision.
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Figure 4 The Break Points
Clearly the Figure 4 gives the following proposition:
Proposition 3 An increase in the size of the external market and/or a decrease
in commuting costs increase the interval between the upper and lower break point.
Furthermore in the case of low commuting costs ( < 0:1) and a big external
market (L = 15) there is only one break point.
3.1 Gradual agglomeration and catastrophic dispersion
Because there are two sustain points and two break points, the location cong-
uration is going to follow a unversed U-curve trade liberalization where such as
dispersion rst appears, where agglomeration occurs later followed by disper-
sion. However, as we have just seen in the previous section, for some value of
parameters there is one break point.
Wiggle diagrams In order to get a full understanding of how the size of
regions globally changes, we make numerical simulations and obtain the so-
called wiggle and tomahawk diagram. That gives:
Proposition 4 In simulations, trade liberalization fosters a gradual agglomer-
ation at rst, then a total agglomeration, and next a catastrophic dispersion.
From gradual to total agglomeration The wiggle diagram plots the
relative real wages in the North as a function of the number of entrepreneurs
located in this country. In Figure 5 we consider the case of four di¤erent high
transaction costs.
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Figure 5 Gradual agglomeration
In the case of high transaction costs, the model develops an interesting and
new feature because there is neither a total dispersion of activities, as in the
Krugman (1991.a) model, nor a total agglomeration as in the Krugman and
Livas (1996) model, but an intermediate case of partial agglomeration. As we
can see in Figure 5 for the regular line ( = 0:01) and dashed line ( = 0:05), the
relative real wage crosses the horizontal line three times, indicating that there
are three interior equilibria, whose sole extremes are stable. Indeed at h = 1=2,
the relative real wage has a positive slope, which means that a south-to-north
migration (or the reverse) is interesting for entrepreneurs, but this interest stops
before agglomeration becomes total, indeed the normal line (dashed line) shows
that after h = 0:85 (h = 0:97), the welfare in the South is higher than that in
the North, which then makes the partial agglomeration stable.
Furthermore, trade liberalization leads to a total agglomeration, for instance
the two small dashed lines ( = 0:07 and  = 0:15) show that only a total
agglomeration in the South or in the North is stable (the relative real wage has
a positive slope).
From agglomeration to dispersion On the Figure 6 we again plot the
relative real wages in the North as a function of the number of entrepreneurs
for three di¤erent values of trade costs. When trade is restricted ( = 0:38) the
location equilibrium reaches a total agglomeration, but if this agglomeration is
stable for such a high degree of transaction costs, at intermediate level however,
this stability is not unique, both dispersion and agglomeration are possible ( =
0:42). Indeed in such a case, the location solution depends on the number of
workers who can benet from being agglomerated. If only a small group of
southern workers tries to move to the North (h < 0:8), then the relative real
wage in this region decreases below unity so that workers would regret their move
and the world economy comes back to the dispersive equilibrium. Conversely, if
the migration shock is higher, then it generates a higher real wage in the North
15
than in the South, and a total agglomeration appears.
Figure 6 Catastrophic dispersion
Lastly at a lower level of trade costs ( = 0:48), the only stable equilibrium is
dispersion, indeed from the dispersed equilibrium (h = 1=2), any South-North
migration implies a decrease in the relative real wage in the North, thus migrants
would prefer to return home and dispersion is a stable equilibrium.
The Tomahawk diagram The Tomahawk diagram summarizes this and
shows how much the size of regions globally changes with trade liberalization.
In Figure 7, the vertical axis measures the number of workers in the North,
while the horizontal axis shows the level of trade liberalization.
Figure 7: The tomahawk diagram
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In this model, four e¤ects determine mobile workers choice of location (i.e.
rms) : the market-access e¤ect, the cost-of-living e¤ect, the local compe-
tition e¤ect, and the land market-crowding e¤ect. While the market access
e¤ect entails a growth in nominal wages, the cost-of-living e¤ect results in a price
reduction. Limiting the e¤ects of these agglomeration forces, the competition
e¤ect and the land market crowding e¤ect, play an opposite role and represent
the two forces of dispersion of the model. One very important characteristic of
the former three forces, is that they all drop toward zero with trade freeness12 ,
while the latter is constant which means that for high trade liberalization, after
s, this last force can dominate, and the dispersion of activities becomes the
only stable equilibrium. However between s and b the di¤erence between
opposite forces is small and agglomeration as well as dispersion become sustain-
able, contrariwise before b the land market crowding e¤ect and competition
e¤ect are overtaken, then a stable agglomeration appears until s. Before s
rms ee the competition through a partial de-agglomeration.
One of the most interesting facts of the tomahawk diagram, is that trade
policy may have no e¤ect for a while, activities remaining dispersed when coun-
tries increase their degree of protection (for instance from free trade to 0 at A)
but a sudden catastrophic e¤ect appears for a higher trade cost (for instance
00). Thus in B, if the whole society takes care of inequality among individuals,
or if a global government exists and has a Rawlsian social welfare function, then
agglomeration is detrimental (see Charlot et al. (2006)), but coming back to
the previous trade policy, 0, does not guarantee that one comes back to the
dispersed equilibrium, indeed the economy could move from B to C, and not
back to A. Thus, location su¤ers from hysteresis.
3.2 Individual welfare
Until now we have only analyzed entrepreneursrelative welfare. Here we pro-
pose a ner analysis by studying the individual welfare of the four interest groups
(h entrepreneurs in the North, h in the South, L workers in the North and L
in the South) which are given by:
Vh(h; ; ; L
) =
(1  h=2)w
 a
V h (h; ; ; L
) =
(1  h=2)w
() a
VL(h; ; ; L
) =
1
 a
V L (h; ; ; L
) =
1
() a
12For instance, in the extreme case of free trade, a delocalisation of rms has no impact on
local competition and on the cost of living because the notion of distance has disappeared.
The market access also becomes easier, so the advantage to be located on the central place to
supply the largest demand vanishes.
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The objective is to analyze these expression under the two opposite equilibria,
agglomeration and dispersion, and then we want to compare them in order to
determine which one is the better social outcome.
Welfare under agglomeration When all entrepreneurs are located in the
North, the welfare of this population is given by:
Vh(1; ; ; L
) =
2b(2L+ L)(1  2 )a(   1)
(1  b)(   2) (31)
According to this expression entrepreneurs do not care about transaction costs
and this is easily understood by the fact that they have nothing to import. Im-
mobile workers in the North share the same indi¤erence concerning transaction
costs, while in the South these costs have a real importance, their decrease is
welfare-enhancing:
VL(1; ; ; L
) = (1  
2
)a (32)
V L (1; ; ; L
) = ((1  
2
))a (33)
Furthermore, even if they do not commute, commuting costs a¤ect their welfare
in both locations because these costs decrease the number of variety available,
and then raise the cost of living (price index) everywhere.
Welfare under dispersion Under dispersion entrepreneurs and workers
welfare are given by:
Vh(
1
2
; ; ; L) = V h (
1
2
; ; ; L) =
21 3ab(2L+ L)(   2)(4  )a 1(1 + )a
b  1 (34)
VL(
1
2
; ; ; L) = V L (
1
2
; ; ; L) = (
1
2
(1  
4
) +
1
2
(1  
4
))a (35)
Agglomeration versus dispersion An entrepreneur prefers agglomeration
to dispersion when Vh(1; ; ; L) > Vh( 12 ; ; ; L
); which is satised (by using
(31) and (33)) when:
 < h =
(4a(2  )a 2(4  5 + 2))1=a
4     1 (36)
This result generalizes the ndings of Charlot et al. (2006) who analyze welfare
in a model without commuting costs (Forslid and Ottaviano model), and nd in
their proposition 3 that "Whatever the level of transport costs, all skilled work-
ers prefer agglomeration to dispersion", indeed here with  = 0, entrepreneurs
prefer agglomeration from autarky to free trade, because in a such case h = 1.
Concerning workers, those in the North prefer agglomeration to dispersion
under the condition that VL(1; ; ; L) > VL( 12 ; ; ; L
). By using equation
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(32) and equation (35) such a result is obtained when:
 < L =
3   4
   4 (37)
In the particular case where there are no commuting costs, northern workers
always prefer the agglomerative equilibrium. In the next gure we plot these
two critical points (h is the black curve which separates the white and gray
area, and L the limit of the gray and black area), the vertical axis measures
the level of trade liberalization while the horizontal axis measures the level of
commuting costs. This gure shows that:
Proposition 5 Conict of group interest in the North: whatever the value of
commuting costs, , we have L > h; which means that if the degree of trade lib-
eralization is between [h; L]; then entrepreneurs prefer dispersion while work-
ers prefer the agglomerative equilibrium.
Proof. we want to prove that L > h, which is equivalent to
h
L
< 1 which
gives after rearrangement from (36) and (37):
4  5 + 2 < (2  )2
() 5 > 4
Thus whatever the value of , we have L > h.
In the South, a worker always prefers dispersion to agglomeration, indeed
by using equation (33) and equation (35) we get:
V L (1; ; ; L
)  V L (
1
2
; ; ; L) =  ( (4  )(1 + )
8
)a + (1  
2
)a < 0
Thus we have:
Proposition 6 Pareto improvement: whereas southern workers are always against
agglomeration, northern workers are in favor of such an equilibrium when the
degree of trade liberalization is lower than L =
3 4
 4 , but beyond this level,
dispersion becomes Pareto improving.
Figure 8 summarizes these ndings, the white area shows that for high com-
muting costs and low trade costs, dispersion Pareto dominates agglomeration
because all individuals are better o¤ in such a situation. In the orange/gray area,
where the level of trade costs and commuting costs are intermediate, workers in
the North are worse o¤ when dispersion appears, whereas workers in the South
and entrepreneurs are better when agglomeration switches to dispersion. Fi-
nally, the black area shows that when commuting costs are low, entrepreneurs
and workers in the North see their situation improved through the agglomeration
of activities, while welfare in the periphery decreases.
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Figure 8 Dispersion versus agglomeration
These results concerning welfare are less ambiguous than those obtained by
Charlot et al. (2006) in the sense that in their model none of the two equilibria
Pareto dominates the other.
3.3 Agglomeration rent
Agglomeration is interesting in the North when 
(1; ; ; L) > 1, which means
that in such a case, an agglomeration rent exists in the North, but what is the
shape of this rent? At h = 1 the agglomeration rent in the North is given by
the following expression:

(1; ; ; L) =
(L2 + L
)(1  )1 a
L
2 (2  (1 + b)(1  2))=2 + L(1  b(1  ))
(38)
To see how this agglomeration rent varies with transactions, we log di¤erentiate
it, which gives:
d
(1; ; ; L)=

d=
= (1  a)(L
2
+ L)(1  )
  2
2((1 + b)L2 + L
=+ 2Lb)
L
2 (2  (1 + b)(1  2)) + 2L(1  b(1  ))
this expression is increasing and decreasing in , we thus make some simulations
in order to illustrate this.
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Figure 9 The agglomeration rent
Figure 9 gives the following proposition:
Proposition 7 An increase in the size of the external market (small dashed line
to regular line) or in commuting costs (regular line to dashed line) decreases the
agglomeration rent. However the bell-shaped conguration is not a¤ected.
4 Trade and governance when activities are ag-
glomerated?
In this section we want to analyze the tax policies of a central government in
the case of a total agglomeration of activities, so we henceforth limit ourselves
to  2 [s; s]. Furthermore, we assume that this central government levies a
tax t on the nominal income in the Core and in the Periphery:
G = tY + tY 
With Andersson and Forslid (2003) we assume that the government consumed
the average consumption basket, in other terms a share 1  of the tax revenue is
spent on agricultural good and a share  on manufactures. Thus the composition
of demand and all the variables that we have analyzed here (wages and prices)
are not a¤ected by the tax because the government spends its revenue in the
same way as the average consumer13 . We are going to consider that this central
government is totally corrupted since it embezzles all the revenue from taxation.
Furthermore, if this government wants to keep the agglomeration of activities
13See also Baldwin et al. (2004, p384) for an explanation of this.
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in the North (we assume that this government is located in this city), it needs
to verify the following condition14 :

(1; ; ; L)  (1  t
)
(1  t)
According to this expression the higher tax rate, denoted t, that the government
can set in the North is a function of 
(1; ) and t and is given by:
t  t = 1  (1  t
)

(1; )
With respect to this upper bound, t and t are chosen in order to maximize15 :
W = c+G
 = (1  eE(t)  rR(t))
where W can be considered as the expected utility of the power with  the gov-
ernments probability of survival, where eE(t) is the probability of an electoral
change of government. The parameter e measures the weight of the electorate
and thus a high e indicates democracy. As there is agglomeration in the North-
ern city, and thus more than half of the total population, the election function is
based on the taxes facing the median voter. rR(t) is the probability of a revolt
of the periphery where r measures the level of instability. This probability of
revolt is assumed to be a function of the level of taxation t. c is a parameter
measuring the value of survival. Because we want an objective function that is
general enough to represent the behavior of a corrupted government as well as
the objective of a non corrupted government too, we choose  such as:
 = k   et
2
2
  rt
2
2
W is thus concave in tax rate since a Leviathan as well as a benevolent gov-
ernment are sucessively risk lover and risk adverse when they increase their tax
rate. Indeed in the both cases their objective functions rise with the revenue
collected and decline with the tax rate. However because the tax rate also has
an impact on the revenue, its shift rst has a positive e¤ect on the objective
and then a negative one. Thus, the objective function needs to be a bell-shaped
curve when tax rate increases which is veried here.
Hence, when entrepreneurs are agglomerated in the North, the objective
function of the government becomes:
W = kc  et
2
2
c  rt
2
2
c+ tY + tY  (39)
14The indirect utility net of taxation in the North needs to be higher than the indirect
utility net of taxation in the South: V (1; )(1  t)  V (0; )(1  t)
15This objective function has been borrowed from Ades and Glaeser (1995)
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In such a context the government needs to maximize W with respect to t, t
under the constraint to keep the Core in the North. The Lagrangian is given
by:
L =W + (1  t+ (1  t
)


)
Then the rst-order conditions give16 :
t =
Y +
(L + rc(
  1))
c(e+ r
2)
(40)
t = 1  (1  Y +
(L
 + rc(
  1))
c(e+ r
2)
)
 (41)
In order to simplify the analysis we are going to consider two polar cases, the
rst one assumes that countries are developed in the sense that there is a high
degree of democracy and a low level of instability, and the second one considers
what happens on the opposite, i.e when countries have a low level of democracy
and a high level of instability. Under these assumptions, we can turn to the
level of corruption, because this government does not supply any public good,
the amount embezzled is equal to:
G = tY + tY 
Thanks to this expression we nd the following proposition which demonstrates
that under a critical value of c (denoted c1) the amount embezzled is bell-shaped:
Proposition 8 The way trade liberalization a¤ects corruption depends on pa-
rameter c as summarized in the following table:
Table 4.1: Corruption, trade and power value
Proof. We have:
@G
@
=
@t
@
Y +
@t
@
Y  (42)
and in the eq.(40) the only variable that depends on  is 
 thus we get:
@t
@
=
@

@
(L + rc)(ce+ cr)  (Y + L)2cr
c2(e+ r
2)2
(43)
16 If the constraint does not bind, the tax rate in the North is given by t = Y
ec
and in the
South by t = Y

rc
, these two tax rates are thus constant with respect to 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therefore at e = 1, r = 0:
@t
@
=
L
c
@

@
(44)
then the tax rate in the Core follows the shape of the agglomeration rent when
trade is liberalized.
Moreover, we know that in order to avoid migration, t is given by:
t = 1  (1  t)

thus
@t
@
=
@

@
(t  1) + @t
@

 (45)
and by using (44) we get:
@t
@
=
@

@
(t  1 + L


c
) (46)
by inserting t into this equation, which is given at e = 1, r = 0 by t = Y+
L

c
we obtain:
@t
@
=
@

@
(
Y + 2
L   c
c
) (47)
hence if c < Y + 2
L then the tax rate in the Periphery is a bell-shaped
function of .
Then when e = 1, r = 0 we get by using (44) and (47) in (42):
@G
@
=
@

@
(
LY + Y Y  + 2
LY    cY 
c
)
because Y  = L this expression can be simplied as:
@G
@
=
@

@
(
L(2Y + 2
L   c)
c
)
hence if c < c2 = 2Y + 2
L, then the embezzled amount is bell-shaped with
respect to  at the reverse if c > c2 the embezzled amount follows a U-curve.
Considering now the case where e = 0, r = 1 we get:
t =
Y + L + c(
  1)
c
2
(48)
by di¤erentiating this expression we obtain:
@t
@
=  @

@
 c2
2(1  2L) + 2
c(Y   L) (49)
where the rst term into bracket is equal to zero since L = 12 , and where the
second term is positive because Y = hwh + L with L = L. The sign of @t@ is
thus the reverse of @
@ , an increase in trade openness rst decreases and next
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increases the tax rate in the Core. Moreover by using (45) and (49) we obtain
the variation of t with respect to :
@t
@
=
@

@
(t  1  2
2c(Y   L))
replacing t by (48) yields:
@t
@
=
@

@
(
c
(1  
  2
3cY + 2
3cL) + Y + L   c
c
2
) (50)
the rst term in brackets is negative since 
 > 1 and Y > L and the second
one also if c > Y +L. Consequently if c > Y +L the tax rate in the Periphery
follows the sign of  @
@ .
Then when e = 0, r = 1 we get by using (49) and (50) in (42) :
@G
@
=
@

@

c
(1  
  2c
3(Y   L)) + Y + L   c
c
2
Y    2
c(Y   L)Y

The terme into bracket is negative if c > c1 =
(L+Y )
2(L Y )Y 
2+Y ( 1+
 
2+2(L Y )
4) ,
in such a case the embezzled amount follows a U-curve, at the reverse if c < c1
then the embezzled amount is bell-shaped with respect to .
We can be more accurate on c by introducing time into the analysis, the
intertemporal budget constraint is given by:
W = c+G
= G+
G
1 + 
+2
G
(1 + )2
+ :::+t 1
G
(1 + )t 1
which gives:
c =
"

1 + 
 


1 + 
t#
G
(1  1+ )
where  is the discount rate. The main di¤erence between a corrupted govern-
ment in a democracy and in a dictatorship concerns their time of living, in a
democracy, for instance in USA or in France, the time of living cannot exceed
two periods, while expected survival in a dictatorship is innite, then we get:
cdem =
G
1 + 
cdic =
G
1 +  
and by using the equation of tax rates (40) and (41) and the fact that in stable
democracy e = 1, r = 0 while in unstable dictatorship e = 0, r = 1 we obtain:
cdem =
Y    Y 
+pY 2(
  1)2 + 4(1 + )(Y + L
)(Y + Y 
)
2(1 + )
(51)
cdic =
Y (
  1)
 +pY 2(
  1)2   4
3(L  Y )(Y + L
)
2
2
(52)
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We rely on simulation in order to know where cdem and cdic are ranked in
comparison with c1 and c2.
Figure 10 Discount rate and the value of surviving
In the Figure 10.a we plot cdem; cdic; c1 and c2 under a high interest rate (equal
to 0.2), and then we observe that cdem belong to the interval [c1; c2] for every
value of trade costs, while cdic is smaller than c1. Thanks to the Table 1 this
gives the following result : bad governance is bell-shaped in stable democracy and
in unstable dictatorship with respect to trade liberalisation when the discount rate
is high.
Interestingly, the Corruption Perception Index reported in the introduction
for countries which di¤er hugely by theirs institution does seem to have followed
such a pattern over the period 1980-2004. However when the discount rate is
low (see Figure 10.b,  = 0:01) this result vanish for unstable and dictatorship
regime, indeed in such a case cdic belong to the interval [c1; c2] for a wide range
of trade costs, and then (see Table 1) corruption becomes a U-curve.
5 Concluding remarks
Recent empirical studies reveal that spatial concentration follows a bell-curve
with trade liberalization. The model that we have developed here, follows these
empirical ndings, and is in accordance with Tabuchi (1998), Puga (1999) and
Ottaviano et al. (2002)s conclusion, indeed we have shown that trade liberal-
ization brings the spatial pattern from dispersion to agglomeration, and from
agglomeration to dispersion. Furthermore, we have demonstrated that disper-
sion is the better social outcome under some conditions, indeed the transition
from agglomeration to dispersion is Pareto improving when commuting costs
are high and trade costs low.
Concerning corruption, in his book untitled "With a little help from my
friends, planning corruption in Ireland", Paul Cullen describes how the Celtic
26
tiger has generated bribery during the last thirty years and in a more acad-
emic way, Ades and Glaeser (1995) also show how bad governance and trade
were linked in the origin of urban giants such as Rome (50 B.C.E), London
(1670 C.E), and Buenos Aires (1900 C.E). In the present model, we have
seen that under democracy and stable regimes or in dictatorships and un-
stable regimes, this bad governance can rst increase and next decrease with
trade freeness. Accordingly, this result suggests that linear econometric meth-
ods are not adapted to study the link between corruption and trade, and
that estimation based on historical data may provide a misleading picture
concerning the future impact of trade liberalization on institutional change.
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